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Of Razorbacks and Reservoirs: The
Endangered Species Act's Protection
of Endangered Colorado River
Basin Fish
JAMES H. BOLIN, JR.*

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) was first enacted in
1973 and will be before Congressfor reauthorizationagain in
1994. This article examines the plight offour endangeredspecies of Colorado River Basin fish and the effectiveness of the
ESA in protecting these species. The authorproposes that the
ESA could and should act as a means to ensure that protection of endangered species is an integralpart of planningand
development rather than a mere remedial afterthought. By
doing this, the ESA would force creative, effective solutions
and begin to dislodge an environmentally unsound system of
western water law.

* Law Clerk to Hon. Harry T. Edwards, United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit, 1993-94. J.D. Yale, 1993; A.B. University of Chicago, 1988. This article was written during an externship at the Denver office
of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund in the fall of 1992. Thanks to Lori Potter
and Drew Caputo of that office for their advice and assistance. Thanks also to
Professor Carol Rose, of Yale Law School, who served as my faculty advisor for
this article, and to Catherine Stempien for her comments and support.
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The last word in ignorance is the man who says of an
animal or plant: "What good is it?" If the land mechanism
as a whole is good, then every part of it is good, whether we
understand it or not. If the biota, in the course of aeons,
has built something we like but do not understand, then
who but a fool would discardseemingly useless parts? To
keep every cog and wheel is the first precaution of intelligent tinkering.
Aldo Leopold'
I.

Introduction - Endangered Fish and Western
. Water Development

In 1962 the United States Bureau of Reclamation began
filling Flaming Gorge Reservoir, a 160 square kilometer impoundment of the Green River along the Utah - Wyoming
Border. 2 Flaming Gorge was to be stocked with rainbow
trout, one of the region's most popular sport fish. In order to
insure that the rainbows had a head start on the "rough" or
"trash" fish native to the river, officials of the Wyoming and
Utah fish and game departments decided to eliminate unwanted species such as the razorback sucker and bonytail
chub. At 8:00 a.m. on September 4th, fifty-five drip stations
began releasing rotenone, a plant-derived poison, along 715
kilometers of the Green River and its tributaries. The three
day operation required "more than a hundred people, numerous vehicles, airboats, a helicopter, and a remarkable amount
of logistic preparation and support."3 Subsequently, in 1963,
the Flaming Gorge Reservoir was stocked with rainbow trout
and kokanee salmon. The razorback sucker and bonytail
1. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND CouNwY ALMANAC 190 (1970).
2. This account of the Green River poisoning relies on the reports in Paul
B. Holden, Ghosts of the Green River: Impacts of Green River Poisoning on
Management of Native Fishes, in BATTLE AGAINST EXTINCTION: NATIVE FISH
MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAN WEST 43 (W. L. Minckley & James E. Deacon,
eds., 1991) [hereinafter BATTLE AGAINST EXTINCTION]; and Richard S. Wydoski
& John Hamill, Evolution of a Cooperative Recovery Programfor Endangered
Fishes in the Upper Colorado River Basin, in BATTLE AGAINST EXTINCTION,
supra, at 123.

3. Holden, supra note 2, at 49.
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chub are now federally protected endangered species, and
could be extinct in the wild by the end of the decade.
The 1962 Green River poisoning, however, did not cause
the endangerment of the razorback or bonytail. In fact, the
ecological changes wrought by the Flaming Gorge dam were
ultimately more of a factor in the reduction of native fish
populations. 4 It was the alteration of riverine environments
by the Flaming Gorge dam and tens of structures like it in
the Colorado River Basin that have brought four indigenous
fish species to the brink of extinction. The Green River
poisoning is, however, a startling and appropriate symbol of
attitudes that had prevailed - and sometimes still prevail toward water "development," not just in the basin, but all
over the West. "Trash" fish and other "useless" species simply did not figure into wildlife managers' decision making. In
fact, during the 1960s many fishery biologists could not or
would not even identify non-game species captured in their
sampling operations. 5
Today four species of endemic Colorado River Basin fish
are listed as endangered:
the Colorado squawfish
(Ptychocheilus lucius), humpback chub (Gila cypha), bonytail
chub (Gila elegans), and razorback sucker (Xyrauchen texanus).6 These species once were common in the Colorado
River system from Wyoming to northwestern Mexico, but today are reduced to a few remnant populations. 7 One study
reports, for example, that the bonytail is "functionally extinct; only a few rare individuals exist."8 This author goes on
to note that "[i]f it were not for the stark example provided by

4. Wydoski & Hamill, supra note 2, at 124.
5. Holden, supra note 2, at 46.
6. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Biological Opinion on the Operation of Flaming Gorge Dam 3 (Nov. 25, 1992) [hereinafter Flaming Gorge
Opinion].
7. Holden, supra note 2, at 46.
8. Holmes Rolston III, Fishes in the Desert: Paradoxand Responsibility, in
BATTLE AGAINST EXTINCTION, supra note 2, at 93, 104 (quoting R.J. Behnke and
D.E. Benson, Endangered and Threatened Fishes of the Upper Colorado River
Basin, COLO. ST. U. Coop. ET. SERV. BULL., 1980 at 1, 20 (Vol. 503A)).
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the passenger pigeon, such rapid disappearance of a species
once so abundant would be almost beyond belief."9
Despite their reputation as trash fish, both razorbacks
and squawfish were eaten by Native Americans and early
white settlers, 10 and razorbacks were commercially fished
and marketed in Arizona until the 1940s. 1 1 Today, however,
none of the four species are valued by anglers,1 2 although all
of them can grow to be quite large. The squawfish, for example, the largest member of the minnow family in North
America and the largest of the endangered river fish, reaches
up to 1.8 meters in length and can weigh 36 kilograms.' 3 The
other endangered river fish are slightly smaller. None of the
four species are brightly colored or strikingly marked. They
are neither majestic nor cuddly, and would be of little interest
to makers of T-shirts or toys.
The decline of the river fish was caused by a complex and
interconnected set of habitat changes wrought by the many
4
dam and diversion projects in the Colorado River basin.'
Perhaps the most significant of these changes was the dams'
alteration of the natural hydrograph 15 of the basin's rivers.
In their natural state, flows in western rivers peak in the
spring with the melting of snow in the mountains and maintain a low and stable flow at other times of the year.' 6 Flows
in dammed rivers, however, peak in the summer and winter
months, when demand for electricity is highest, and flows at
other times fluctuate much more widely than in free-flowing
9. Id.
10. W.L. Minckley et al., Management Toward Recovery of the Razorback
Sucker, in BATTLE AGAINST EXTINCTION, supra note 2, at 303, 307-08; Harold M.
Tyus, Ecology and Management of the Colorado Squawfish, in BATTLE AGAINST
EXTINCTION, supra note 2, at 379.
11. Holden, supra note 2, at 44.
12. Id.
13. Tyus, supra note 10, at 379.
14. For a discussion of these changes see, e.g., Flaming Gorge Opinion,
supra note 6 at 6-24; Wydoski & Hamill, supra note 2, at 124.
15. "A stream hydrograph shows the discharge of a river at a single location
as a function of time." CHARLEs W. FETTER JR., APPLIED HYDROGEOLOGY 37
(1980).
16. Wydoski & Hamill, supra note 2, at 124.
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river systems. 17 In addition, the water released into the basin's rivers from its many reservoirs alters the rivers' natural
temperature and sediment transport rates. 18 The endangered river fishes' spawning, migration, and other behaviors
are keyed to many distinct and poorly understood temperature, flow, and chemical clues related to the natural
hydrograph.19 The alteration of the Colorado River Basin rivers' hydrographs has thus disrupted almost every phase of
the fishes' life cycle.
The river fish have lost spawning and living habitat directly through the flooding of many river reaches to make
reservoirs. 20 Dams and reservoirs also block fish migration
routes, interfering with spawning and cutting off previously
occupied habitats. Finally, non-native fishes that have been
introduced accidentally or intentionally into the basin's waters - sixty-seven species as of 198921 - prey on the endangered river fish and compete with them for food and
22
habitat.
The destruction and alteration of riverine habitats
caused by reclamation projects such as Flaming Gorge was a
product of both conventional wisdom and western water law.
Under the doctrine of "prior appropriation" that governs
water use in the west, water left in natural watercourses is a
wasted resource. Under this regime, water rights are
granted according to the order in which appropriators put
water to a "beneficial use," and are retained so long as that
beneficial use continues. 2 3 The practice developed among
miners who established a system of rough justice in which
the first person who used water from a stream retained that
right against subsequent users; a practice later extended to
17. Flaming Gorge Opinion, supra note 6, at 5.
18. Wydoski & Hamill, supra note 2, at 124.
19. See Flaming Gorge Opinion, supra note 6, at 8; 12-13 (squawfish); 17-18
(humpback); 19 (bonytail); 20-21 (razorback).
20. Wydoski & Hamill, supra note 2, at 126.
21. Rolston, supra note 8, at 105.
22. Wydoski & Hamill, supra note 2, at 124, 126.
23. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water
Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 572 (Colo. 1979).
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agricultural uses. 24 The prior appropriation doctrine encouraged water users to divert as much water as they could
possibly use as soon as they were capable of using it, in order
to stake a claim to a resource that was essential in an arid
land. 25 In contrast to the riparian system that developed in
eastern states, western water users have historically been
under no obligation to avoid impairing the rights of downstream users. Senior appropriators have the right to their
entitlement of water, even if that entitlement completely
26
dewaters a stream.
Western law, tradition and politics all stress consumptive uses of water. Historically, economic productivity in the
west has depended on ranching, farming, and mining, which
in turn depend on moving significant quantities of water out
of rivers and streams. 2 7 The Colorado Basin is a maze of tunnels, ditches, aqueducts, and dams which enable the basin
states, which receive less precipitation per kilometer than
any other major watershed in the United States, to provide
28
water for more than fifteen million people.
But these water projects, and the thinking behind them,
were products of a different era. Both law and politics have
gradually come to recognize that so-called "instream uses" of
water can be as or even more valuable than consumptive
uses. 2 9 Western economies are turning away from mining
and agriculture toward tourism and recreation. 30 Several
24. Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of
Western Water Law in Response to ChangingEconomic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347, 349-51 (1989).
25. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 555 (1963); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 140 (1976).
26. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 5.08[1], at 537 (1990).
27. See TARLOCK, supra note 26, § 5.02[1], at 5-5 (1990); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Law of the American West: A Critical Bibliography of the Nonlegal
Sources, 85 MICH. L. REv. 953, 984 (1987).
28. Wydoski & Hamill, supra note 2, at 123.
29. See Steven J. Shupe, Keeping the Waters Flowing: Stream Flow Protection Programs, Strategies and Issues in the West, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST 1, 4 (1989).
30. See Brian Morris, When Rivers Run Dry Under a Big Sky: Balancing
Agricultural and Recreational Claims to Scarce Water Resources in Montana
and the American West, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 259, 260-61 (1992).
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studies have suggested that water left instream for rafters
and tourists to enjoy can offer far greater economic returns
than traditional consumptive uses.3 1 In addition, as the West
becomes more urbanized, 3 2 cities and industries increasingly
demand a greater share of the water that now goes to senior
agricultural appropriators at heavily subsidized rates. 33 The
wave of the future, no pun intended, is to reconsider and in
some cases reallocate western water, a task that implicates
environmental concerns, property rights, urban and regional
planning, and more.
In the thick of the redesign of water law and policy in the
Colorado River Basin, amid the computer models and market-based allocation schemes, will be four unglamorous fish:
the razorback sucker, humpback chub, bonytail chub, and
Colorado squawfish. The river fish are currently protected by
the Endangered Species Act 34 (ESA), but have enjoyed far
less than the full protection to which they are entitled under
that statute. Between 1977 and 1981, the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) determined that the operation of
every major existing and proposed water project in the basin
jeopardized or would jeopardize the continued existence of
the river fish, 35 but it has done little more than study the
problem in the intervening decade, in direct contravention of
the ESA. In 1987 FWS instituted its "Recovery Program for
Endangered Fish Species in the Upper Colorado River Basin"3 6 to mitigate the impacts of proposed water depletions on
the river fish. 3 7 Despite the recovery program's pointed failure to attain even its own modest goals, FWS has not man-

31. See, e.g., Bonnie G. Colby, The Economic Value of Instream Flows Can Instream Values Compete in the Market for Water Rights? in INSTREAM
FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST 87, 91 (1989).
32. See Johnson & DuMars, supra note 24, at 356.
33. George A. Gould, Transfer of Water Rights, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 457,
471-73 (1989).
34. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
35. Wydoski & Hamill, supra note 2, at 126.
36. Id. at 128.
37. Id.
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dated further actions to protect the fish, again in violation of
3
the ESA. 8

The plight of the river fish is a startling indicator of just
how radically we have altered the ecology of the basin. Their
recovery will require rethinking western water policy and
generating creative solutions that provide intelligently for
both people and fish. The possibilities are endless and fascinating - water marketing, mandatory conservation, and
other schemes are in place or coming fast.39 It is precisely
this sort of innovative reevaluation of water policy that the
West is lurching toward in the 1990s and beyond. Rather
than dragging their collective feet, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Reclamation, the United States Army
Corps of Engineers, and other federal agencies responsible
for water projects in the basin should squarely assume their
40
responsibilities under the Endangered Species Act.
II. An Overview of the ESA and its Application to the
River Fish
When the ESA was enacted in 1973, few could have foreseen the power and reach the statute would come to have in
subsequent years. In the watershed case of Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill (TVA v. Hill),4 1 the Supreme Court held that
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b), (c)(1) (1988).
39. For example, a recent Oregon statute, OR. REV. STAT. § 537.455(2)
(1991), encourages conservation by permitting appropriators to sell or lease
water they save, less a portion that reverts to the state for instream flow maintenance. Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and The Future of
Water Law, 61 U. CoLO. L. REV. 257, 277 n.68 (1990). In addition, the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992 provides for some market sales of water from California's Central Valley Project. See Pub. L. No. 102575, 106 Stat. 4600, 4709-14 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 371 (1993)).
40. Under the ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), these
responsibilities include: the agency must consult with the Secretary about possible agency action, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3) (1988); the agency must confer with
the Secretary regarding action that may jeopardize the existence of a listed species, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4) (1988); the agency may not commit any irreversible
resources which would conflict with the implementation of a reasonable and
prudent alternative, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (1988); and prior to implementing a
revised recovery plan, the agency must consider all information received during
the public comment period, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(5) (1988).
41. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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the Act required enjoining the completion of Tellico dam, virtually complete at the time the suit was filed, 4 2 to protect the
43
habitat of the endangered snail darter, a three-inch long
fish with no commercial value. The Court held that the "language, history and structure" of the ESA "indicate[ ] beyond
doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities."4 4 The opinion was - and is
highly controversial, but the ESA remained essentially intact after Congress reconsidered it in the wake of TVA v.
Hill.45 The 1978 amendments created a process by which
species could be exempted from the ESA's protection by the
extraordinary action of a cabinet level committee. This group
of ten, known as the "God Committee," has, however, rarely
been convened, and the ESA's substantive protections have
remained intact through several other rounds of
amendments.
ESA section 4 authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, or
the Secretary of Commerce in the cases of certain marine animals, 46 to list species as "threatened" or "endangered," and so
42. Id. at 157-58. The dam was 50% complete at the time the Endangered
Species Act became effective and some 70-80% complete when the snail darter
was officially listed as an endangered species. Id. at 165.
43. Id. at 158.

44. Id. at 174.
45. The ESA is up for reauthorization again in 1994, but Congress is not
likely to consider it until late that year. See William K Stevens, Battle Looms
Over U.S. Policy on Species, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993 at C1. It is predicted

that the battle over reauthorization will be a bitter one, with environmentalists
on one side arguing for a strengthening of the Act and property rights advocates
on the other arguing for a weakening of the Act. Id. The environmentalists are
likely to argue for the inclusion of a multi-species preventative focus, rather
than the single species-by-species focus of the current Act. See H.R. 2043,

103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Sponsored by Rep. Gerry E. Studds, D-MA). The
property rights advocates are likely to argue for the inclusion of mandatory
compensation for the loss in value of their property due to the enforcement of
the Act. See H.R. 1490, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Sponsored by Rep. W.J.
Tauzin, D-LA). Property rights advocates hope that by requiring compensation

to affected property owners, the government will be discouraged from enforcing
the Act aggressively.
46. The Department of Commerce has jurisdiction under the ESA over
marine animals, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2) (1988), and has delegated this responsibility to the National Marine Fisheries Service, 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (1990), for

the marine animal species listed in 50 C.F.R. §§ 222.23(a), 227.4 (1990).
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to invoke the protections of the Act. 47 The section also directs

the Secretary to designate "critical habitat,"48 unless doing so
would harm the species, 49 for instance, by alerting collectors
to the location of an endangered plant. The ESA defines "critical habitat" as:
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied
by the species, at the time it is listed . . . on which are

found those physical or biological features (I) essential to
the conservation of the species and (II) which may require
special management considerations or protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied
by the species at the time it is listed ...upon a determination by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the
conservation of the species. 50
In a rare concession to economic interests, the ESA explicitly
authorizes the Secretary to weigh the benefits of designating
an area as critical habitat against the benefits of excluding it,
unless the area's exclusion would result in a species' extinction.51 The Secretary must make this consideration based on

the "best scientific data available and after taking into consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant
52
impact."

47. The Secretary's responsibilities under section 4 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533 (1988), include: creating lists of endangered and threatened species, 16
U.S.C. § 1533(c)(1) (1988); publishing these lists, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(cX1) (1988);
reviewing these published lists, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2) (1988); issuing protective
regulations for listed species, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1988); developing and implementing recovery plans for the conservation and survival of the endangered and
threatened species, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1988); implementing a system to monitor all species which have recovered and have been removed from the list, 16
U.S.C. § 1533(g) (1988); and establishing and publishing agency guidelines to
insure that the purposes of section 1533 are achieved, and under section 7 of the
ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988), reviewing other programs and consulting with
other agencies.
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A) (1988).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1988).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (1988).
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1988).
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(B)(ii) (1988).
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The ESA offers two types of protection to listed species,
the section 7 "consultation" process, 5 3 and the section 9 "taking" prohibition. 54 Section 9 provides that it is unlawful for
any actor, private or governmental, to "take" any listed species, defining that term as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect or attempt to engage in any such conduct." 55 FWS regulations further define
"harm" to include "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feeding or sheltering."5 6 Given that the term "take"
is so expansively defined, it might seem at first that section
9's protection would be relatively clear. In application, however, the section is not a bright line rule, as it implicates the
murky issues of causation that emerge when legal rules are
applied to actual injuries. Damage to habitats is even less
easily defined, especially in an ecosystem with as many users
57
as the Colorado River Basin.
Section 7 is the heart of the ESA, and the source of most
of its requirements. Its first subsection, 7(a)(1), requires that
all federal agencies "shall . . . carry[ ] out programs for the
conservation of endangered species and threatened species
...
"58 The ESA defines "conservation" to mean ".... the use
of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring
any endangered species to the point at which the measures
59
provided pursuant to [the ESA] are no longer necessary."
Section 7(a)(1) thus can be read to require agencies to take
affirmative steps to aid species' recovery, and some courts
6
have so held. 0
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1988).
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988).
56. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1992).
57. For further discussion, see supra, notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
58. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1988).
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1988) (emphasis added).
60. For an authoritative discussion of section 7(a)(1) and the cases interpreting it, see James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A Closeup Look from a Litigator'sPerspective, 21 ENVTL. L. 499, 56472 (1991); see also DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE
TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 92-100 (1989).

11
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ESA section 7(a)(2) imposes a two-part requirement on
"any action authorized, funded, or carried out by"6 1 any federal agency. Although section 7 applies only to federal actors,
activities such as issuing permits to private persons often require section 7 review. For example, a "dredge and fill permit" under section 404 of the Clean Water Act 62 is required
for almost any water project, and the Corps of Engineers'is63
suance of section 404 permits is subject to section 7 review.
Section 7 requires that the federal agency "insure" that the
action (1) is not "likely to jeopardize the continued existence
-of any endangered species" (the "nojeopardy" standard) or (2)
"result in the destruction or adverse modification of [the critical] habitat of such species" (the "no adverse modification"
standard). 64 The two standards tend to merge, as adverse
modification of critical habitat may well jeopardize a species'
survival. The "no adverse modification" standard, however,
appears to require a lower threshold showing of harm to a
species, as adverse modification is a section 7(a)(2) violation
65
even when it does not threaten a species' survival.
The substantive requirements of section 7(a)(2) are implemented through "consultation" with FWS. Before undertaking any action which "may affect listed species or critical
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
63. See Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 512 (10th Cir.
1985); Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1156,
1172-73 (D. Neb. 1978).
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
65. See Colorado Wildlife Fed'n v. Turner, No. 92-F-884, slip op. at 7 (D.
Colo. Oct. 27, 1992) (ordering FWS to designate critical habitat for razorback
sucker: "Only by defining the critical habitat can modifications be scrutinized
under the standard set forth in 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)."); Memorandum from
Acting Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 2-3 (July 11, 1991) ("thresholds
for Section 7 'jeopardy' and [adverse modification] are different . . . in most
cases, designation of critical habitat may provide greater conservation benefits
to the species"). But cf James Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical
Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act, 14 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 311, 324
(1990) (Although the thresholds are different, "when a court finds an adverse
modification violation, it necessarily also finds a jeopardy violation." Therefore,
in practice, "adverse modification has merged into jeopardy analysis, ceasing to
be an independent protection.").
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habitat," 66 the "action agency" must consult with FWS as to
whether the action will violate section 7(a)(2). FWS may also
request consultation on its own initiative. 67 During the consultation process, the action agency must provide FWS with
the "best scientific and commercial data available or which
can be obtained during the consultation" concerning the action's potential impacts on endangered species. 68 FWS then
reviews this data and issues a "biological opinion," or, if FWS
concludes that it has insufficient data, it may request that
consultation be extended. While consultation is ongoing,
ESA section 7(d) mandates that neither the action agency nor
any private permit applicant "shall... make any irreversible
or irretrievable commitment of resources with respect to the
agency action which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternative measures ....
Biological opinions can come to one of three conclusions.
If FWS issues a "no jeopardy" opinion, the project may proceed as planned. "Jeopardy" opinions come in two forms: a
naked "jeopardy opinion" or a jeopardy opinion with "reasonable and prudent alternative" (RPA). If possible, FWS must
formulate an RPA, containing modifications to the proposed
action that will enable it to avoid a naked jeopardy opinion.
If FWS is unable to come up with an RPA, then it simply issues a jeopardy opinion. The biological opinion may also include "conservation recommendations," suggestions as to
steps the action agency could take to reduce 'the impacts of
the proposed action on endangered species. These conservation recommendations are, however, purely advisory and are
not legally enforceable.
Finally, ESA sections 7(b)(4)70 and 7(o)(2)71 allow FWS to

authorize limited takings of protected species. When an action will result in takings that do not rise to the level of a
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

50 C.F.R.
Id.
50 C.F.R.
16 U.S.C.
16 U.S.C.
16 U.S.C.

§ 402.14(a) (1992).
§ 402.14(d) (1992).
§ 1536(d) (1988).
§ 1536(b)(4) (1988).
§ 1536(o)(2) (1988).
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section 7(a)(2) violation, the biological opinion may authorize
a specified "incidental take." The incidental take authorization must set forth mandatory "reasonable and prudent
measures" to minimize take, and if the action agency exceeds
the permitted take, it is required to reinitiate section 7 consultation immediately. 72 It is unclear whether FWS is required to authorize incidental takes so long as they do not
violate section 7(a)(2), but ESA section 7(b)(4) notes the
agency "shall provide" such authorization, suggesting that it
73
does not have the discretion to refuse.
Four main rationales are usually advanced in support of
protecting all species, even small and apparently "useless"
ones such as the snail darter, from extinction.7 4 First, it is
often suggested that many species may have economic value
that is presently unknown and that would be lost if they were
permitted to become extinct. Proponents of this view point to
potential medical uses such as the recent discovery of the possible cancer-fighting properties of taxol, found in yew trees in
Pacific coast forests, or to the value of genetic material in
other plants for breeding disease-resistant strains of crops.
Critics of this view argue that we cannot know in advance
which species may be useful or what their uses might be, and
that we thus cannot justify the ESA in economic terms because the value of species preservation is unknown and un-

72. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i) (1992).
73. 16 U.S.C. 1536(b)(4); see also, 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(1) (1992) (When an
incidental take has occurred that does not violate the provisions of ESA section
7(a)(2) the agency must provide, with the biological opinion, a statement specifying facts such as: the impact of the taking on the species; the reasonable
measures necessary to minimize such impact; and the procedures to be used in
the taking); see generally Frederico Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibition
Against Takings in Section 9 of the EndangeredSpecies Act of 1973: Learning
to Live with a Powerful Species PreservationLaw, 62 U. CoLo. L. REv. 109, 165
(1991).
74. For a thorough discussion of the arguments for and against protection
of Colorado River Basin species, see Rolston, supra note 8. For discussions of
the arguments for and against species preservation generally, see, e.g., ROHLF,
supra note 60, at 12-17; Cheever, supranote 73, at 113-17; A. Dan Tarlock, The
EndangeredSpecies Act and Western Water Rights, 20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1,
3-5 (1985), and the works cited by these authors.
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knowable. 75 Indeed, Congress did not include economic value
76
among its list of reasons to preserve endangered species.
A second justification for species preservation is the argument that we have an ethical obligation not to completely
eliminate other life forms. Many, if not most, people in the
United States have some sympathy for this view, at least so
far as "glamorous megafauna" such as eagles and pandas are
concerned. 77 While support for the furbish lousewort may fall
short of that for the peregrine falcon, there is widespread
support for species preservation, as is evidenced by the ESA's
repeated reauthorization.
A third argument for preservation is that biodiversity is
a good in itself, and that it is dangerous to remove any link in
the biotic chain, lest we cause changes we cannot foresee. It
is sometimes noted that the force of this argument is blunted
by the fact that, by definition, few individuals of an endangered species remain, and thus their removal is unlikely to
have widespread biological effects. This is particularly true
in the case of isolated endemics such as the snail darter,
which exist in only a few, limited habitats. However, it is
also true that isolated species, such as Darwin's Galapagos
and so can provide a
finches, evolve under unique conditions 78
study.
for
resource
valuable
unique and
The final and perhaps most persuasive argument for species preservation is closely related to the biodiversity rationale. Endangered species can be viewed as canaries in the
75. See, e.g., Tarlock, supra note 74, at 4.
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1988).
77. See generally Charles C. Mann & Mark L. Plummer, The Butterfly Problem, THE ATLANTc MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 47 (discussing the economic hardships caused by cancelling development projects because of possible danger to
listed species); see also Julie B. Bloch, Preserving Biological Diversity in the
U.S.: The Case for Moving to an Ecosystems Approach to Protect the Nation's
Biological Wealth, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 199 (1992) (discussing the
shortcomings of single species patchwork protections).
78. The Colorado River Basin contains a higher percentage of endemic species - species found in no other habitat - than does any other North American
river. See Rolston, supra note 8, at 94. These endemics are often characterized
by unique adaptations. The humpback chub, for example, has the most pronounced stabilizing "nuchal hump" of any fish on this continent, to help it survive in fast-flowing waters. Id.
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biotic coal mine, as indicators of the overall health of ecosystems and of the extent of their perturbation. By radically altering the environment, we run the risk of severe unintended
consequences. Critics of this argument suggest that we do
not need indicator species - miners now use electronic
monitors rather than canaries 79 - but this argument
presumes that we know of and fully understand all of the effects that need to be measured. As DDT's creep up the food
chain demonstrated years ago,8 0 we often cannot foresee the
full environmental effects of our actions.8 1 We thus ignore
the interconnection of living things at our peril.
The "indicator species" rationale8 2 undergirds the current and coming generation of litigation under the ESA. A
brief but insightful article by J.B. Ruhl notes that the ESA
has "evolv[ed] through three distinct phases: (1) single-project focus; (2) regional growth regulation; and (3) natural resource management." 3 In the first phase, typified by TVA v.
Hill,8 4 litigation focused on the impacts of a single federal
project, usually some form of construction, and sought to
79. Id.

80. See generally RACHEL

CARSON, SILENT SPRING

(1987).

81. Recent government studies regarding the persistence of DDT in the environment have indicated that it is, in fact, a serious ongoing problem. JOSEPH
F. RINELLA ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 1090, PERSISTENCE OF
THE DDT PESTICIDE IN THE YAKimA RIVER BASIN WASHINGTON (1993). For example, in one recent study in the Yakima River Basin in Washington the U.S.
Geological Survey found:
[Tihat chemical breakdown of T-DDT is slow because, despite the
ban on the production and distribution of DDT in 1972, concentrations of T-DDT in the Yakima River near Kiona commonly exceeded
the chronic-toxicity criterion for the protection of freshwater
aquatic life between 1972 and 1990. The contaminated agricultural
soils could, therefore, provide a large and long term reservoirof TDDT to streams and fish in the Yakima River Basin for decades to
come.
Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
82. For a general discussion of the indicator species rationale, see Jeb Boyt,
Comment, Struggling to ProtectEcosystems and Biodiversity Under NEPA and
NFMA: The Ancient Forests of the Pacific Northwest, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
1004 (1992).
83. J.B. Ruhl, Phase Three of the ESA: Using EndangeredSpecies Protection as a Natural Resource Management Tool, 6 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT,
1992, 38, 38 (1992).
84. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying discussion.
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block or alter it. Ruhl suggests that phase two grew out of
the 1982 amendments' authorization of "incidental take" permits for private actors in ESA section 10.85 One of section
10's requirements is a "habitat conservation plan." 86 According to Ruhl, "the section 10 process has taken hold in states
such as California, Texas, Nevada, and Florida in the form of
huge regionalized extravaganzas covering tens of thousands
87
of acres of prime undeveloped urban and suburban land."
Ruhl further contends that these habitat conservation plans
have required developers to set aside "vast conservation
tracts" and have limited growth on a region-wide scale, tak88
ing the ESA to new heights of controversy.
The third and current phase of ESA enforcement "is to
extend ESA jurisdiction to control large-scale resource management decisions." 9 The watershed cases which ushered in
this new era were the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund's
(SCLDF) efforts to restrict logging of old growth forest in order to protect the northern spotted owl. 90 The spotted owl is
a classic "indicator species" in that it only nests in old growth,
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1988) describes the "incidental take" as a taking which is incidental to, and not the purpose of, conducting an otherwise lawful activity.
86. Under 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A):
No permit may be issued by the Secretary authorizing any taking referred to in paragraph (1)(B) [incidental taking] unless the
applicant therefor submits to the Secretary a conservation plan
that specifies(i) the impact which will likely result from such taking;
(ii) what steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such impacts, and the funding that will be available
to implement such steps;
(iii) what alternative actions to such taking the applicant considered and the reasons why such alternatives are not being utilized; and
(iv) such other measures that the Secretary may require as being necessary or appropriate for purposes of the plan.
Id.
87. Ruhl, supra note 83, at 39.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash.
1992) (granting injunctive relief); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F.
Supp. 1473 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (granting partial summary judgment).
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and its decline thus parallels the disappearance of such forests. 91 The owl's critical habitat covers a significant portion
of the Pacific Northwest, and its preservation will require
major changes in the Forest Service's timber management
practices, rather than merely halting a single construction
project. A similar case, though on a smaller and less politically controversial scale, was SCLDF's successful suit on behalf of the red cockaded woodpecker (RCW) in Texas. 92 The
RCW, like the spotted owl, nests in old growth forest, and its
protection required that the Forest Service alter its ongoing
silvicultural. practices by changing a program designed to
93
control the pine beetle.
Further evidence of "phase three" ESA litigation is
presented in Sierra Club v. Lujan,94 recently decided in
Texas. In Lujan, the plaintiffs sought to use the ESA to limit
water use from the Edwards Aquifer, which supplies San
Antonio, several military bases, and farmers and ranchers in
Southwest Texas. 95 Two springs fed by the aquifer are the
sole habitat for the endangered fountain darter and for several other endangered animals and plants. 96 The court ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering the FWS to designate minimum flows necessary to protect the darter, the Texas blind
salamander, and the Texas wild-rice.
The Lujan court also ordered the Texas Water Commission to develop a plan to prevent putting these species in jeopardy, and suggested that if the State legislature failed to act,
the court would fashion relief by controlling withdrawals
from Edwards Aquifer. 97 Such water regulation has, of
course, historically been the province of the states. Realloca91. Boyt, supra note 82, at 1010. See generally Elizabeth A. Foley, The Tarnishing of an Environmental Jewel: The Endangered Species Act and the
Northern Spotted Owl, 8 J. LAND USE & ENrL. L. 253 (1992).
92. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd in part
sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yuetter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
93. Id. at 1277-78.
94. No. MO-91-CA-069, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3361 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 30,
1993).
95. Id. at *10, *77.
96. Id. at *13-14.
97. Id. at *92.
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tion of water rights by a federal court, or even permitting
FWS to set withdrawal limits which would bind a state water
commission, would break new ground in enforcement of the
ESA.
A final suit seeking to use the ESA to force the federal
government to undertake regional resource planning is Pacific Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns v. Lujan,98 which
SCLDF filed in California Federal District Court in 1992. In
that suit the plaintiffs alleged that the Bureau of Reclamation was in violation of the ESA section 7 Reasonable and
Prudent Alternative 99 to which it had agreed in order to protect endangered runs of spawning chinook salmon. According
to the plaintiffs, the Bureau failed on an almost constant basis to comply with its agreement to maintain daily average
water temperatures of no more than fifty-six degrees Fahrenheit in the stretch of the Sacramento River below one of its
dams. Because it released too much cool water from its reservoir in early spring in order to supply agricultural users, the
Bureau was unable to maintain a low enough water temperature during the summer. Plaintiffs argued that the Bureau
was required by the ESA to insure that it had sufficient cool
water to meet its obligations to protect the salmon before it
allocated water for other uses. The Bureau eventually agreed
to alternative reservoir releases that would enable it to meet
its temperature obligations for 1992, and so the suit was dismissed without prejudice. The settlement leaves several key
questions unresolved, however. Chief among these is
whether or not the ESA's requirements trump the Bureau of
Reclamation's obligations to provide water for consumptive
uses. 100
98. No. CIV-S-92 1492 LKK (E.D. Cal. 1992). This account of the suit is
based on a telephone interview with Michael Sherwood of SCLDF's Seattle office, plaintiff's attorney (Nov. 4, 1992), and the briefs and letter of notice of
intent to file citizen suit under ESA section 11, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988), filed
in the case.
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (1988).
100. See Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Watt, 549 F. Supp. 704,
710 (D. Nev. 1982) (holding that the Secretary of the Interior was required to
utilize all of the water from Stampede reservoir for the benefit of an endangered
fish, the cui-ui, in preference to the Washoe Act's requirement that the Secre-
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The Colorado Basin fish present "phase three" ESA issues on the grandest scale to date. The Basin covers portions
of six states, 10 1 including some of the most rapidly growing
areas in the country. The river fish are wide-ranging species
with distinctive habitat needs for different phases of their life
cycles. A sustainable squawfish population, for instance,
"will occupy (and presumably require) hundreds of kilometers
of river." 10 2 The river fish, in sharp contrast to, say, the desert pupfish - whose entire habitat consisted of a single
spring which is now Devil's Hole National Monument - cannot be protected merely by protecting a single river segment.
Further, since hydrological systems are linked to one another, actions taken upstream will have inevitable repercussions downstream, both legal and ecological. If the
requirements of the Endangered Species Act are to be met,
FWS will be forced to do more than merely tinker with releases from a few reservoirs. At present the agency is ducking its responsibility.
tary sell water for purposes of cost-recovery). The appellate court held, however, that the Washoe Act imposed no such requirement, and held only that the
Secretary was permitted by the ESA to choose to use all of the reservoir's water
for conservation purposes, as he had done in that case. Carson-Truckee Water
Conservancy Dist. v. Watt, 741 F.2d 257, 260-61, 262 n.5 (1984). See also Fdlbourne, supra note 60, at 566-68. These questions may be further litigated in
the pending suit, Idaho Dep't of Fish and Game v. National Marine Fisheries
Serv., Civ. 93-0345-S-HLR (D. Idaho filed Sept. 10, 1993), which involves a
challenge to NMFS's biological opinion issued on May 26, 1993, concerning the
operation of the Federal Columbia River Power Systems' impact on listed Snake
River Salmon. The biological opinion called for the release of water stored in
the Bureau of Reclamation reservoirs to assist the downstream migration of
juvenile salmon. Pleadings have been filed through Nov. 9, 1993, as well as
motions of transfer and motions of opposition. A motion for summary judgement was filed by the Attorney General's office on Oct. 18, 1993. Idaho is seeking a declaration from the court that the Federal Columbia River Power
Systems' operation is a violation of the ESA. Telephone Interview with William
S. Whelan, Deputy Attorney General, Natural Resources Division, Attorney
General's Office of Idaho, in Boise, Idaho (Nov. 15, 1993).
101. RIVER BASINS OF TE UNITED STATES: THE COLORADO, U.S. Dept. of Interior/ U.S. Geological Survey, U.S.G.P.O. No. 1993-348-882 (1993). The basin
includes parts of Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Nevada, and California, as well as a portion of Mexico. Id.
102. James E. Deacon & W. L. Minckley, Western Fishes and the Real World:
The Enigma of "EndangeredSpecies" Revisited, in BATTLE AGAINST EXTNcTiON,
supra note 2, at 405, 408-09.
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III. ESA Section 7 Consultations in the Colorado
River Basin -

Flaming Gorge Dam

Reoperation
Section 7 consultations 03 for water projects in the river
basin have consistently failed to comply with the ESA. The
proposed reoperation of Flaming Gorge Dam is an instructive
example of many of the respects in which FWS has, to date,
failed to follow the dictates of the Act.
Although the archetypical ESA case involves a planned
construction project such as a dam, highway or other structure, section 7's protections are not limited to large projects
or new undertakings. Section 7 expressly applies to "any prospective agency action." 10 4 As the Supreme Court noted in
TVA v. Hill:
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision
whose terms are any plainer than those in § 7 ....

This

language admits of no exception. Nonetheless, petitioner
urges, as do the dissenters, that the Act cannot reasonably
be interpreted as applying to a federal project which was
well under way when Congress passed the Endangered
Species Act of 1973. To sustain that position, however, we
would be forced to ignore the ordinary meaning of plain
language.' 0 5

As a lower court wrote two years later, "not only prospective
actions, but all actions contemplated by an agency are subject
to ESA scrutiny." 0 6 Given the ESA's expansive reach, section 7's requirements apply not only to new water projects,
103. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988) provides that:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency... is not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
habitat of such species.
Id.
104. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(aX3) (1988).
105. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978).
106. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 351 (D.D.C. 1980)
(noting that Congress' 1978 and 1979 amendments to the ESA indicate that it
approved of the Supreme Court's construction of the term "agency action").

21

56

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11

but also to those built decades before the Act was passed.
Professor Tarlock makes this point emphatically:
Project operators will argue that there is a distinction between new and existing [water] projects, but this distinction is irrelevant.... [T]he Act applies to existing projects
as well as to new ones and any other conclusion would
frustrate the purpose of the Endangered Species Act.107
Thus, the full array of the ESA's requirements are effective
against both new and existing federal projects in the basin.
In keeping with section 7's requirements, in 1980 FWS
requested that the Bureau of Reclamation (BR) enter into
section 7 consultations for its existing projects in the Colorado River Basin.' 0 8 These consultations resulted in jeopardy
opinions with an RPA requiring releases of water from existing reservoirs to protect endangered fish. 10 9 Consultations
on proposed BR projects in the late 1970s and early 1980s
also resulted in jeopardy opinions with RPAs requiring releases from existing reservoirs to offset depletions. 110
There is one important exception to this pre-1981 consultation pattern: Flaming Gorge Dam. At approximately the
same time that consultation began for Flaming Gorge, FWS
issued jeopardy opinions for the proposed Strawberry
Aqueduct and Collection System, and for the Upalco, Jensen,
and Uinta Projects - all components of the Central Utah
Project (CUP). 111 FWS also issued a jeopardy opinion for
Flaming Gorge Dam itself. The RPA for each of these jeop107. Tarlock, supra note 74, at 27-28 (citations omitted).
108. Memorandum from Regional Director, Region 6, U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, to Regional Director, Upper Colorado Region Water and Power Resources Service (Feb. 27, 1980).
109. Flaming Gorge Opinion, supra note 6, at 1; Wydoski & Hamill, supra
note 2, at 126. See also Margot Zallen, Evolution of ESA Consultationson Western Water Projects, 2 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1986, 41, 41 (1986). It is
unclear if these sources are referring only to consultations for new BR projects,
or also to the consultations on existing ones which began in 1980. The author
has found no documentation suggesting that the existing projects involved in
the 1980 consultations participated in the RIP or rely on Flaming Gorge reoperation for an RPA.
110. Flaming Gorge Opinion, supra note 6, at 1.
111. Id.
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ardy opinions was the reoperation of Flaming Gorge Dam for
the benefit of endangered fish. In addition, in 1992 FWS issued jeopardy opinions for the Narrows Project and the PriceSan Rafael Salinity Control Project which also rely on Flaming Gorge as an RPA. 112 Ironically, the dam which was the
site of the 1962 Green River poisoning is now being proposed
1
as the means to protect the river fish. 13
Although the decision to use Flaming Gorge reoperation
as an RPA for the CUP structures was made in the early
1980s, FWS did not issue the Final Flaming Gorge Biological
Opinion until late November 25, 1992. During the intervening years, FWS studied the effects of Flaming Gorge's operation, evaluating "normal operation" from 1979-1984, and
"constrained flows" from 1985-1991. The Strawberry
Aqueduct and the Jensen Unit, for which Flaming Gorge's reoperation is an RPA, began operation several years ago while
the Flaming Gorge studies were still in progress. It bears repeating that FWS found over ten years ago that all of these
projects placed or, when complete, would place the river
fishes' survival in jeopardy. The other two CUP projects for
which Flaming Gorge reoperation is an RPA, the Uinta and
Upalco units, have yet to begin construction.
The Biological Opinion for Flaming Gorge is a jeopardy
opinion with a five-part RPA. The first of the RPA's two substantive components is reoperating the dam so that flow and
temperature conditions in the Green River will more closely
resemble the river's natural hydrograph. The RPA's second
substantive requirement calls for legal protection of Green
River Flows from the dam downstream to Lake Powell, noting that "development of a legal mechanism to ensure that
the releases from Flaming Gorge Dam are delivered to and
available for use by the endangered fish in occupied habitat
. . is necessary" if the Jensen, Uinta, Upalco, Narrows, and
Price-San Rafael Projects are to comply with the ESA and the
river fish are to recover." 4 To this end, the RPA assumes
*

112. Id.
113. Id. at 9.
114. Flaming Gorge Opinion, supra note 6, at 32.
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that agreements to protect instream flows will be reached
with the states of Utah, Colorado, and Wyoming under the
auspices of the Recovery Implementation Program, or
"RIP."1 15 If such an agreement is not in place within two
years of the promulgation of the Biological Opinion, FWS
may request reinitiation of section 7 consultation. The other
three of the RPA's five components mandate further studies
intended to refine dam reoperation. While additional study
of Flaming Gorge's effects will surely be beneficial, it will not
help mitigate the present impacts of the projects for which reoperation is an RPA. Finally, the biological opinion does not
authorize any incidental take of endangered river fish:
"Is]hould any take occur, Reclamation must reinitiate formal
16
consultation."'
FWS's actions during the Flaming Gorge consultation
were and are in violation of several provisions of the ESA.
First and most obviously, while consultation is ongoing ESA
section 7(d) unequivocally forbids "any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources with respect to the agency
action which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or
implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternative
measures .. .."117 FWS issued jeopardy opinions for Flaming
Gorge and the two CUP Projects, Strawberry Aqueduct and
the Jensen Unit, in the early 1980s. However, the RPA for
these projects, Flaming Gorge reoperation, was still being formulated in 1992. During the decade in which FWS studied
reoperation there was no assured RPA in place for any of the
three projects. Indeed, until the parameters of reoperation
were more clearly specified, there could be no assurance that
the RPA would in fact preclude the section 7(a)(2) 1" jeopardy
that FWS had already found the projects posed. FWS apparently understood that consultation on Flaming Gorge reoperation was ongoing until a final biological opinion was in
place. The 1987 RIP for the basin commits FWS to "make
115. For a further discussion of the Recovery Implementation Plan see infra
notes 220-242 and accompanying text.
116. Flaming Gorge Opinion, supra note 6, at 35.
117. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (1988).
118. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
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every effort to complete Section 7 consultation on operation of
Flaming Gorge during 1989." 119
ESA section 7 permits FWS and an agency taking action
to agree to extend consultation almost indefinitely, so long as
any private permit applicant involved in the process consents
to the extension. 120 Thus, the more than ten-year-long consultation over Flaming Gorge, while startling, was not contrary to law. However, FWS and the BR used this drawn out
consultation process as an excuse to continue business as
usual, in direct contravention of section 7(d). 121 When an
agency action is proposed, the section 7 consultation process
"give[s] the benefit of the doubt to the species" and places the
burden squarely on the action agency to prove that its action
will not jeopardize endangered species. 12 2 So long as the
Flaming Gorge consultation was ongoing, section 7(d) clearly
applied to all of the projects which relied on it as an RPA.
It could be argued that biological opinions were in fact
completed for Flaming Gorge and the CUP projects, and FWS
then spent the next decade refining and revising the RPA
portion of those opinions. Both the Act's legislative history
and ESA case law indicate that section 7 does permit FWS to
issue a biological opinion based on "the best evidence that is
123
available or [that] can be developed during consultation."
However, these same sources hold that: "[s]hould such an
opinion be issued, the action agency must continue research119. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Recovery Implementation Program for
Endangered Fish Species in the Upper Colorado River Basin (1987), quoted in
Flaming Gorge Opinion, supra note 6, at 2 (emphasis added).
120. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(1)(A),(B) (1988).
121. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
122. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 159, reprinted in
1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2557, 2576, cited in Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F.
Supp. 1123, 1155 (D. Alaska 1983); see also Nebraska v. Rural Electrification
Admin., [1979] 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156, 1171 (D. Neb. Oct. 2, 1978) (ESA
.places the burden upon the agencies" to show their actions will not jeopardize
species).
123. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 159, reprinted in
1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2557, 2576, cited in Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F.
Supp. 1123, 1155 (D. Alaska 1983) and North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F.
Supp. 332, 352 (D.D.C. 1980), affd in relevant part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir.
1980).

25

60

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11

ing the effects of agency action on a species. Consultation
must also be continued until a comprehensive biological opin124
ion satisfying the mandate of section 7(b) is developed."
The most thorough explication of section 7(d) is in North
Slope Borough v. Andrus,' 25 in which Alaskan native groups
and environmental organizations sought to block the sale of
federal oil leases in the Beaufort Sea to protect endangered
gray and bowhead whales. The case was somewhat unusual
in that the sales were controlled by the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act which specifically permits the United States
to withdraw previously sold oil leases in the event environmental or other problems arise in the course of exploration.
North Slope, however, concerned only the sale of leases, not
all of the activities surrounding oil exploration. The district
court held that a letter from the National Marine and Fisheries Service (NMFS) to a Bureau of Land Management official
regarding the sales was not enough to constitute a biological
opinion, and that section 7 consultation had thus never been
completed and section 7(d) therefore applied. The court
noted, however, that inadequate information cannot provide
the basis for a halt to all agency action, and proposed a threepart test for agency actions where consultation was based on
incomplete information.1 26 Although the government could
not assure compliance with section 7(a)(2) until it completed
an adequate biological opinion, it could pursue oil lease sales
if "(1) there is a reasonable likelihood of ultimate compliance
[with section 7(a)(2)], (2) there is no section 7(d) violation,
and (3) the intermediate steps taken pursuant to the agency
action comply with 7(a)(2)."1 27 Explaining the first prong of
its test, the court noted that: "A negative biological opinion,
regardless of the stage of development, would constitute substantial evidence of non-compliance [with section 7(a)(2)]. "'28
124. North Slope, 486 F. Supp. at 352 (emphasis added); accord H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 96-697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 159, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2557, 2576.

125.
126.
127.
128.

486 F. Supp. at 354.
North Slope, 486 F. Supp. at 357.
Id. at 358.
Id.
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North Slope held that there was not a jeopardy opinion for
the oil lease sales and that the letter from NMFS to Interior,
while not adequate as a biological opinion, did indicate that
129
jeopardy was unlikely.
As for the second prong of the North Slope test, the district court wrote that:
Congress enacted section 7(d) to preclude the investments
of large sums of money in any endeavor if (1) at the time of
the investment there was a reasonable likelihood that the
project, at any stage of development, would violate section
7(a)(2), and (2) that investment was not salvageable (i.e. it
could not be applied to either an alternative1 30approach to
the original endeavor or to another project).
The court held (again) that the lease sales were not likely to
violate section 7(a)(2), and that the only investments of resources proposed at the time of the suit were pre-exploration
research activities which were valuable in their own right.
Consequently, the second prong was satisfied.
The third prong of the North Slope test is a procedural
standard. This component provides that the action agency
must comply with the consultation requirements of section
7(a)(2).13 ' The North Slope court held that since there was no
biological opinion, not even one based on adequate information, the Department of the Interior could not proceed with
32
the lease sales.'
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit noted that NMFS had regarded its letter concerning the lease sales as a biological
opinion.1 3 3 The court thus deferred to NMFS's judgment and
held that the district court erred in ruling that the Department of the Interior was in violation of the consultation requirements of section 7(a)(2) for failing to obtain a biological
opinion. 13 4 The appellate court, however, expressed no disap129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 351.
Id. at 356 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 357.
486 F. Supp. at 352, 353.
642 F.2d 589, 609-10 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 610.
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proval of the lower court's analytic framework, and wrote
that: "[g]iven the conceded 'incomplete information' on which
the biological opinion is based, and the government's declared
intention to prepare a new opinion.., we reach no conclusion
as to whether the section 1536(a) 'consultation' process is
35
ongoing."
North Slope's analytical framework makes it clear that
FWS violated section 7(a)(2) during the period in which it
was preparing the Flaming Gorge biological opinion. FWS's
biological opinions for Flaming Gorge and the four CUP
projects issued in the early 1980s are certainly based on incomplete information, which should preclude any action by
BR which would violate section 7(d) or be reasonably likely to
violate section 7(a)(2). Contrary to the situation in North
Slope, in which NMFS had concluded that Interior's lease
sales were unlikely to jeopardize endangered whales, FWS issued jeopardy opinions over a decade ago on all three existing
projects which rely on Flaming Gorge as an RPA. As the
North Slope district court held, a jeopardy opinion is conclusive evidence that an agency's actions are likely to violate section 7(a)(2). Given that jeopardy opinions have already
issued for the three projects, the operation of Flaming Gorge
Dam, Strawberry Aqueduct, and the Jensen Unit without an
RPA in place was a clear violation of section 7(a)(2)'s substantive prohibitions against jeopardizing the survival of endangered species.
FWS is also in violation of section 7(d). Again, section
7(d)'s ban on "irreversible" or "irretrievable" commitments of
resources applies until a complete biological opinion is in
place. Flaming Gorge reoperation is to serve as the RPA for
all three projects, but has yet to be fully implemented. Indeed, "normal operation" - the very operation which led to
FWS's jeopardy finding - continued until 1984. Nevertheless, BR went ahead with construction of Strawberry
Aqueduct and the Jensen Unit, and has placed them in operation, even though the RPA for the project has yet to be imple135. Id. at 611, n.143.
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mented. 1 36 Spending federal money on a construction project

of resources
is the archetypical "irretrievable commitment"
137
section 7(d) is designed to prevent.

Further, it is eminently reasonable to argue that the "resources" referred to in section 7(d) need not be monetary.
Water is also a resource, and a valuable one, particularly in
the Colorado River Basin. However, Flaming Gorge Dam has
continued normal or nearly-normal operation for more than a
decade since it received a jeopardy opinion. Each year it has
released the water it impounds, "irretrievably" and "irreversibly" committing it to uses other than protection of endangered fish.'38 The release of the impounded water also has
had "the effect of foreclosing the . . .implementation" of an

RPA, since the proposed RPA for the project was and is the
139
release of that very water.
BR has also violated section 7 by continuing construction
and/or operation of the CUP projects and operation of Flaming Gorge Dam before being reasonably certain that the RPA
136. Since Strawberry Aqueduct went on line, BR has reportedly slightly increased flows from Flaming Gorge Dam during the periods the Aqueduct is in
operation. There is, however, no formal biological opinion indicating that these
releases are adequate. Further, there is no proof that these releases benefit
endangered fish rather than downstream appropriators. The Flaming Gorge
draft biological opinion specifically notes that to compensate for depletions from
Strawberry Aqueduct it is "critical" that BR obtain legal protection to insure
that water from the dam remains instream in the Green River to a point below
the confluence of the Duchesne River. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Final
Draft Biological Opinion for the Operation of Flaming Gorge, 34 (Feb. 11, 1992)
[hereinafter Flaming Gorge Final Draft Opinion]. However, to date BR apparently has taken no steps to protect instream flows.
137. See Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., [1979] 12 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1156, 1172 (D. Neb. Oct. 2, 1978).
138. The plaintiffs in Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Ass'ns v. Lujan, CIV-S-92-1492 LKK (E.D. Cal. 1992), offered a similar section 7(d) argument (discussed supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text).
139. The North Slope district court did suggest that commitment of resources for the sake of research would generally not violate section 7(d), 486 F.
Supp. at 356, and BR argued that its releases from Flaming Gorge were part of
a study designed to determine the endangered fishes' habitat requirements.
North Slope, however, suggests that a necessary condition of the oil lease sales
at issue in that case surviving section 7(d) scrutiny was the fact that they were
not likely to jeopardize an endangered species' survival in violation of section
7(a)(2). Id. As the case held, a jeopardy opinion is conclusive evidence that a
project is likely to violate section 7(a)(2). Id. at 358.
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for the projects can in fact be implemented. 140 As was noted
above, one of the two substantive elements of the Flaming
Gorge biological opinion is the legal protection of the flows of
the Green River south to Lake Powell. FWS noted in the final draft version of the Flaming Gorge opinion that this is a
"critical ingredient" of the RPA since without it the BR cannot insure that releases from Flaming Gorge Dam are availor that they will offset depletions
able for endangered species,
141
projects.
CUP
four
by the
The final biological opinion allows two years for the relevant parties - which include BR, the states of Utah, Colorado and Wyoming, private water-user groups and the
Northern Ute Indian Tribe - to develop an agreement to protect instream flows for the river fish. 142 During those two
years BR is apparently not required to protect instream flows
may, but is
in any fashion. At the close of that period FWS 143
not required to, reinitiate section 7 consultation.
The Flaming Gorge biological opinion's proposal is strik44
ingly similar to the circumstances of Sierra Club v. Marsh,
in which the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Corps of Engineers
was in violation of section 7.1145 In Marsh, the plaintiff envi-

ronmental groups sought to enjoin the Corps of Engineers
ongoing construction of a flood control and highway project.146 FWS issued a jeopardy opinion for the project because
of the presence of two endangered bird species in the area,
but permitted it to go forward under an RPA that required,
among other measures, that the Corps acquire and preserve
188 acres of nearby wetlands. 147 Because of delays in appropriating funds for the acquisition, the County of San Diego
agreed to acquire the property and transfer it to a federal
agency to be designated by the Corps, and a contract was
140. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3XA),(B) (1988).
141. Flaming Gorge Final Draft Opinion, supra note 136, at 34; see also
Flaming Gorge Opinion, supra note 6, at 32-33.
142. Flaming Gorge Opinion, supra note 6, at 33.
143. Id.
144. 816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1987).
145. Id. at 1389.
146. Id. at 1378.
147. Id. at 1379.
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signed to that effect. 148 The County, however, failed to transfer the land, and went on to approve development near the
wetlands and granted several easements to the developer,
which reduced the value of the wetlands as habitat for the
endangered birds. 149 FWS concluded that the Corps' failure
to acquire the mitigation lands and the County's approval of
new development near the habitat created a new danger that
the Corps' project would violate section 7(a)(2). Consequently, FWS requested reconsultation. The Corps, however,
refused to enter reconsultation, contending that it would ultimately prevail on its contract claim against the County and
thus would be able to implement the RPA. The plaintiffs in
Marsh alleged that the Corps had violated the ESA by refusing to reconsult, and sought to enjoin further construction until reconsultation was completed. 150
The Marsh court rejected the Corps' claim that the plaintiffs were required to show that it was more likely than not
that the Corps would not be able to obtain the mitigation
lands. 15 ' The court wrote that "[alt present construction is
eliminating some of [the birds'] habitat. The [Corps] is allowing the project's adverse effects to accumulate without implementing the mitigation measures or making certain they
will occur." 15 2 Although the court noted that the Corps as-

sured it that it would win its suit against the County, it held
that:
the risk that the [Corps] might not prevail must be borne
by the project, not by the endangered species ....

[The

Corps] is in violation of section 7(a)(2) by allowing, destruction or adverse modification of any part of the birds habitat
without first insuring the acquisition and preservation of
the mitigation lands. 153

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1380.
at
at
at
at

1381.
1385.
1385.
1386.
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The court went on to parse the section 7(a) consultation regulations, 15 4 holding that the County's failure to transfer the
lands constituted "new information" requiring reconsultation
under 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(b), and that the section 7(a) duty to
reconsult was thus mandatory. 15 5 Marsh thus enjoined construction in the area of the birds' habitat until the Corps'
claim to the mitigation lands could be resolved and enjoined
56
all construction until the Corps initiated reconsultation.
The court concluded by observing that the ESA "dictates that
if an agency plans to mitigate its project's adverse effects on
an endangered species by acquiring habitat and creating a
refuge, it must insure the creation of that refuge before it per5 7
mits destruction or adverse modification of other habitat."1
In order to implement the RPA proposed in the Flaming
Gorge biological opinion, BR must acquire, or at least protect,
habitat - adequate flows to support endangered fish - just
as surely as if it were required to purchase land. As was
found improper in Marsh, to do so the agency must rely on
the good will and cooperation of another government. However, BR lacks even the contractual assurances that were
present in Marsh, and acquiring instream flows is an inherently far more uncertain undertaking than purchasing land.
Further, in order for Flaming Gorge to succeed as an RPA,
BR must resolve instream flow issues in several states and
across a number of different water districts. It is also far
from clear whether sufficient water is available for appropriation or purchase - the draft biological opinion hedged by
noting that protection of Green River flows should be accomplished "to the extent of [the state governments'] jurisdiction
and legal authorities and subject to existing valid water
rights.' 5 8
154. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1988).
155. Marsh, 816 F.2d at 1386-88.
156. Id. at 1389. Marsh also noted that until consultation was completed,
the section 7(d) prohibition against irretrievable commitments of resources
would apply, but did not elaborate on section 7(d)'s requirements. Id.
157. Id.
158. Flaming Gorge Final Draft Opinion, supra note 136, at 35.
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The final biological opinion significantly weakened the
strong language in the draft version concerning the pressing
need to acquire instream flows, but this change was not due
to any progress on that front. The draft required the states of
Utah and Colorado to execute a Memorandum of Understanding addressing legal protection of flows under the auspices of the biological opinion itself.' 59 However, the final
version simply relies on the efforts of the RIP,16° which has so
far failed to protect instream flows despite approximately five
years of trying to do so. 16 1 In spite of these substantial remaining hurdles, depletions by the Strawberry Aqueduct
have already begun to diminish the river fishes' available
habitat, and Flaming Gorge operation continues apace. Absent a working RPA, the CUP projects addressed in the biological opinion and Flaming Gorge Dam have already been
found to violate section 7(a)(2). Under the terms of the biological opinion, they will be permitted to continue to violate
that subsection for up to two years before FWS will even con16 2
sider requiring reconsultation.
Finally, the Flaming Gorge process is potentially in violation of ESA section 9.163 The 1982 ESA amendments authorized "incidental take statements" under sections 7(b)(4)
and 7(o)(2).164 Under these provisions, as part of its biological opinion, FWS may authorize takings of listed species so
long as the take will not violate section 7(a)(2). ESA section
7(b)(4) explicitly provides that incidental take may be authorized "after consultation." 65 Although no cases have considered the issue, it seems reasonable to suggest that incidental
take permits can only be authorized after an adequate consultation has been completed. If takings are permitted before
consultation concludes, FWS cannot insure that compliance
with section 7(a)(2), mandated by section 7(b)(4), can be
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. at 33.
For further discussion, see supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
Flaming Gorge Final Draft Opinion, supra note 136, at 33.
16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1988).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4), (o)(2) (1988).

165. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (1988).
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achieved. Thus, any take by the two CUP projects or by
Flaming Gorge during the decade since jeopardy opinions
were issued should be deemed a violation of section 9. In any
case, the Biological Opinion for Flaming Gorge authorizes no
incidental take, and requires reconsultation should any take
occur. 16 6 Therefore, if any taking of river fish can be shown
even after the final opinion is in place, BR will be in violation
of section 9.
The section 9 issue is significant chiefly because of the
uncertainty surrounding the meaning of "take", particularly
in a riverine environment. 16 7 The unresolved questions are
analogous to the basic categories of tort law, but, in the case
of endangered river fish, unraveling proximate cause, cause
in fact, and other issues, as well as defining the scope of
redressable injuries, is a daunting task. A thorough discussion of these matters is beyond the scope of this article, but
some of the key questions bear mentioning here. 68 Since the
endangered river fish are extremely rare, very wide ranging,
and live underwater where they generally cannot be seen by
humans, it is virtually impossible to point to dead members of
the species as evidence of a taking. It should not, however, be
necessary to bring dead fish to court or even to demonstrate
population declines in order to win a section 9 claim.
Case law has long indicated that section 9 encompasses
habitat modifications, including those with future effects,
166. Flaming Gorge Final Draft Opinion, supra note 136, at 35 (emphasis
added).
167. Section 9 specifically prohibits any person subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States from taking any listed, endangered species of fish or wildlife
within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1538(a)(1)(B) (1988), or from taking any such species upon the high seas, 16
U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(C) (1988), except as provided for in 16 U.S.C § 1535 (g)(2)
(1988) and 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1988).
168. For an excellent and thorough analysis of section 9, see Cheever, supra
note 73. For an analysis of section 9 in the context of water depletions, see
Melissa IK Estes, Comment, The Effect of the Federal EndangeredSpecies Act
on State Water Rights, 22 ENV'rL. L. 1027 (1992), arguing that depletions are
section 9 takings. It has been argued that since stream flow depletion has been
cited as a cause of the decline of the listed species any failure to augment flows,
or a continuation of the depletion of flows, could amount to a prohibited "taking" of endangered species under section 9 of the ESA.
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although a decision just issued by the D.C. Circuit has created a split among the circuits. In what is probably the best
known pair of cases, Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land
and Natural Resources (I and II),169 the Ninth Circuit held
that the presence of goats in the habitat of an endangered
bird species constituted a section 9 taking because the goats
ate the shoots of trees which, when mature, serve as food
sources and nest sites for the birds. 170 This holding came in
spite of the fact that plaintiffs could not show that the palila
population had declined. The district court in that case was
persuaded that the likelihood of future harm was sufficient to
constitute a taking, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that
reasoning.17'
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held in Sierra Club v. Yeutter172 that the Forest Service's east Texas timber management practices constituted a section 9 "take" of red-cockaded
woodpeckers, because the agency's policy of even-aged harvesting "resulted in significant habitat modification."' 73 The
court cited with approval FWS regulations defining the ESA
term "take" as including habitat modifications that significantly "impair[ ] . . . 'essential behavioral patterns',"'7 4 and
held that the Forest Service "took" woodpeckers because its
timber cutting practices caused them to abandon the old
growth trees in which they nested.
The scope of the section 9 taking prohibition recently became considerably less clear, however. In March of 1994, as
this article went to press, a panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed
its decision of seven months earlier, and held that section 9's
169. 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988)
[hereinafter Palila 111; 471 F. Supp. 985 (1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.
1981) [hereinafter Palila I].
170. See Palila I, 639 F.2d at 496. But ef., National Wildlife Fed'n v. National Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 389-90 (D. Wyo. 1987) (rejecting argument
that operation of campground would take grizzly bears on the ground that FWS
found in biological opinion that plan would not result in takes and previous
year's operation had caused no bear mortalities).
171. PalilaI, 649 F. Supp. at 1073, 1075.
172. 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
173. Id. at 438 (quoting Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex.
1988).
174. Id. at 438 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1989)).
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taking prohibition does not encompass habitat modification.
In Sweet Home Chapterof Communities for a Great Oregon v.
Babbitt,175 the court, without rebriefing or additional argument, reversed its earlier opinion of the same name. The
original Sweet Home decision 17 6 rejected the argument that
section 9 takings could occur only when there is an actual
physical injury to a specific member of a protected species.
That opinion upheld FWS's regulations defining the section 9
take prohibition as including habitat modification. This is
the same regulation that the Palila and Sierra Club v. Yeutter cases looked to for their holdings. Thus, Sweet Home I
aligned the D.C. Circuit squarely with the Ninth 7 7 and Fifth
Circuits on this issue.
However, in an unusual turnabout, the Sweet Home I
panel reversed its earlier decision after the appellants in that
case petitioned for rehearing. At issue in Sweet Home I was
FWS's definition of the word "harm," one of the terms used in
the ESA to define "take." 78 As defined by FWS regulations,
acts which "harm" endangered species include those which
significantly modify its habitat. 179 Sweet Home II relied on
the maxim noscitur a sociis, the principle that a word used in
a statute is "known by the company it keeps," to reason that
the terms Congress used in section 9 (harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect), "contemplate the perpetrator's direct application of force against the
animal taken ....
The forbidden acts fit, in ordinary lan-

175. No. 92-5255, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4341 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 11, 1994)
[hereinafter Sweet Home III.
176. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 1
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Sweet Home 1].
177. Id. at 11 (Mikva, C.J., concurring)(noting that the panel's decision accords with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Palila II).
178. The ESA defines "take" to mean "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)(1989) (emphasis added).
179. The term "harm" includes "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering." 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.3 (1992).
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guage, the basic model 'A hit B.'"'180 Two members of the
panel concluded that habitat modification lacked this element of "direct force," and so was not contemplated by section
9.
The Sweet Home II majority relied in part on the Ninth
Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Hayashi,"s l which
applied noscitur a sociis to interpret the "take" provision of
the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA").18 2 Hayashi
reversed the criminal conviction for taking a marine mammal
of a fisherman who had fired two rifle shots into the water
behind a group of porpoises which were feeding on tuna
caught on the fisherman's lines. 8 3 The MMPA defines "take"
to mean "to harass, hunt, capture, or kill" any marine mammal, or to attempt to engage in those activities. 18 A divided
panel held that a "take" under the MMPA must "involve a
sustained, direct, and significant intrusion" into the mammal's natural routine, and thus dismissed Hayashi's conviction on the ground that he was engaged in "isolated
i8 5
interference with abnormal marine mammal activity."
The opinion failed to explain, however, how the activities of a
porpoise eating tuna that it came upon in the open ocean
could possibly be regarded as "abnormal." The Hayashi majority's ruling was perhaps motivated, as the dissent to that
decision suggested, by a sense that criminal prosecution for
an act that posed little or no threat to the porpoises' safety
was unreasonable.' 8 6 It is difficult to imagine, however, how
future courts are to decide whether a given defendant should
be deemed to have shot at marine mammals with an intent to
hit (or at least to harass) them, or whether a particular shot
posed a sufficiently "significant" intrusion.
Whatever the merits of Hayashi, that decision offers no
real support for the result reached in Sweet Home I.
180. Sweet Home II No. 92-5255, slip op. at 4-5, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4341
at *4-5.
181. 5 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 1993).
182. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(2XA) (1988).
183. Hayashi, 5 F.3d at 1279.
184. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
185. Hayashi, 5 F.3d at 1282, 1283.
186. Id. at 1284 (Browning, J., dissenting).
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Hayashi limited its holding to acts which do not cause sustained or significant intrusions. In fact, the opinion focuses
on one-time acts that seek to divert animals from injuring
humans or damaging property. 187 In contrast, FWS's definition of "harm" is already limited to "significant" habitat modifications that "significantly" impair a species' behavior.
Firing a rifle in the vicinity of a porpoise to scare it away from
a single meal is categorically different from, for example, altering its habitat so as to affect its breeding or feeding in the
long term. Hayashi nowhere endorses the "A hit B" model
employed by Sweet Home II, but rather focuses on the significance of the disruption caused to a protected animal's activities. 8 8 This reading of Hayashi is further supported by the
fact that the Ninth Circuit has already held, in the Palila
cases, that habitat modification is a taking under the ESA.
Sweet Home II's interpretation of section 9 is difficult to
reconcile with the ESA's overriding concern with habitat
modification. In TVA v. Hill, for example, the Supreme Court
observed that when Congress enacted the ESA, it "started
from the finding that the two major causes of extinction are
hunting and destruction of natural habitat. Of these twin
threats, Congress was informed that the greatest was destruction of natural habitats."18 9 Sweet Home II reasoned
that Congress intended to protect habitat by providing funds
for land acquisition, rather than via section 9.190 This conclu-

sion rests, however, only on two statements from the floor debates on the original ESA.191 The opinion cites no other
authority for the proposition that section 9 should be limited
to banning hunting, trapping, and related activities, while
leaving habitat protection, the primary threat to species' survival, to the vagaries of the appropriations process. A better
reading of the grouped terms in section 9 - "harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect" 187.
188.
189.
phasis
190.
191.

Id. at 1283, n.15.
Id. at 1282.
437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978)(internal quotation and brackets omitted, emadded).
No. 92-5255, slip op. at 6-7, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4341 at *9.
Id. at 6-7, *12.
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is that Congress intended to create an exhaustive list of acts
that might injure protected species. The Senate Report on
the ESA stated that: "'Take' is defined in . . . the broadest

possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a
192
person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife."
To read section 9 in any other fashion renders much of the
section surplusage: "killing" an animal necessarily "harms"
and "wounds" it; "hunting" necessarily involves at least some
element of "pursuit;" "trapping" is "capture" and possibly "collection;" and so forth. The interpretation adopted by the
Sweet Home II majority requires that we assume that despite
its concern with habitat destruction, Congress elected to permit private actors freely to engage in the very acts which
presented the greatest threat to species' survival. From a
common sense perspective, there can be no doubt that the destruction of a species' source of food or shelter causes "harm,"
as that word is ordinarily used, both to the species generally
and to its individual members.
Sweet Home H also relied on the legislative history of the
1982 amendments to the ESA, 193 which added the incidental
take provisions to the Act. 94 This analysis was based chiefly
on the absence of specific statements endorsing the inclusion
of habitat modification in section 9, as Congress nowhere explicitly disapproved of the practice. Indeed, as Sweet Home II
recognized, both the regulatory definition of "harm" and the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Palila II were brought to the attention of congressional committees considering the 1982
amendments, but Congress expressed no disagreement with
either. 195 In fact, Palila I held that Congress' failure to modify FWS's interpretation of section 9 in 1982 indicated the
legislature's satisfaction with the "take" definition. 196
A strong argument can be made that Congress intended
to ratify FWS's interpretation of section 9 in 1982. The Con192. S. Rep. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2995 (quoted in PalilaH, 852 F.2d at 1108).
193. No. 92-5255, slip op. at 8-13, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4341 at *13-34.
194. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1988).
195. Id. at 12.
196. 852 F.2d 1106, 1109 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988).
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ference Report on the 1982 amendments provides that the incidental take provisions are "modeled after a habitat
conservation plan that has been developed by three Northern
California cities, the county of San Mateo, and private landowners and developers .... " 19 7 Sweet Home II dismissed this
reference as evidence only of the "flexibility of the relief' Congress intended to offer by allowing incidental take permits. 198
This reading conflicts, however, with the very rationale underlying habitat conservation plans. Such plans seek, as
their name implies, to preserve habitat - habitat that otherwise faces modification at the hands of, among others, private
developers. As Congress was aware, given the FWS regulations in place at the time, the private entities who entered
into the conservation plan cited in the 1982 Conference Report's did so not simply because they were concerned that
their bulldozers might run over a specific member of a protected species, but because they realized that alteration of
habitat would "harm" endangered species, as FWS defined
that term. In short, the Conference Report expressly approved of a remedial measure, habitat conservation plans,
that grew out of FWS's longstanding interpretation that section 9 encompassed habitat modification.
Sweet Home 11 presents a straightforward administrative
law question governed by the framework established by the
Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council.199 However, as Chief Judge Mikva observed
in a highly persuasive dissent, although the Sweet Home 11
majority noted that it reviewed the statute pursuant to Chevron, the opinion never stated which prong of that case's test it
relied upon to reach its conclusion. 200 As the dissent noted, if
the majority relied upon Chevron step one, it must demonstrate that Congress has "'directly spoken to the precise ques197. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) 30-31, reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2871-72.
198. No. 92-5255, slip op. at 11, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4341 at *19 (emphasis
added).
199. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
200. No. 92-5255, slip op. dissent at 2, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4341 at *37
(Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
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tion at issue': whether the word 'harm' includes" habitat
modification. 201 However, the language of section 9 can
scarcely be said to compel the result reached by the Sweet
Home I majority. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, in Palila11, concluded that the FWS's definition of "take" followed the "plain
language" of section 9.202 If, on the other hand, Congress has

not directly addressed the scope of "harm," then Chevron requires that a reviewing court uphold FWS's interpretation so
long as it is a "permissible" reading of the statute. 20 3 It is

now well-settled that Chevron step two review is not a demanding standard. Indeed, as Chief Judge Mikva observed,
Chevron itself provides that a court "need not conclude that
the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could
have adopted.

.

., or even the reading the court would have

reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding." 20 4 Given that nothing in the ESA or its legislative
history precludes FWS's reading, and that the inclusion of
habitat modification "serves the overall purpose of the
[ESA]," 205 the section 9 regulations certainly appear to be a
permissible interpretation of that Act.
Although there is now a square conflict between the D.C.
Circuit and the Ninth and Fifth Circuits on the issue, the better reading of section 9 seems to be that given by the FWS in
its regulations. Indeed, until Sweet Home 11 was decided, it
had been settled for over a decade that section 9's prohibitions encompassed habitat modification. Given that Flaming
Gorge Dam and the projects for which it serves as an RPA
have, without question, significantly modified and continue
to modify the river fishes' habitat - thereby impairing the
fishes' spawning, feeding and other behaviors - it seems
clear that FWS has long overlooked "takes" of river fish in
violation of ESA section 9.
201. Id. at 2, *39 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
202. 852 F.2d at 1108.
203. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
204. Sweet Home II, No. 92-5255, slip op. dissent at 2, 1994 U. S. App. LEXIS
4341 at *39-40 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting)(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.1).
205. Palila11, 852 F.2d at 1108.
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If a taking of river fish can be demonstrated, determining
which parties are responsible presents a further quandary.
In a system of thousands of miles of rivers with hundreds of
diversions, impoundments, and depletions, it is extremely difficult to designate any one dam or water user as the cause of
injury to a species. For example, in Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe v. United States Department of Navy 20 6 plaintiffs al-

leged that the Navy was taking cui-ui, an endangered trout
species. 20 7 The court noted that the Navy was one of many
diverters of the Truckee River,20 and that its diversions had
20 9
a relatively insignificant effect on the availability of water.
Pyramid Lake thus held "[t]he evidence does not establish
that any one year's diversions of Project water has actually
caused the cui-ui's spawning problems. Moreover, the Tribe
fails to distinguish the Navy from other users of Truckee
210
River water."
Even when a taking occurs at a single, known water project, it can be difficult to determine who should actually be
held responsible for the violation. In 1992, in United States v.
Glenn-Colusa IrrigationDist.,211 NMFS argued that an irri-

212
gation district's pumping was killing protected salmon.
The defendant countered that it was actually a fish screen,
installed by the California Fish and Game Department,
against which salmon fry became pinned, that caused the
taking.2 13 The court found the case an easy one, finding the
irrigation district was the cause of the undisputed death of
salmon 214 and noting that "[ilt is irrelevant whether the taking is direct or indirect."215 However, had the question of
causation been between the irrigation district, which operated the pumping station, and its individual members, who
206. 898 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1990).
207. Id. at 1412.
208. Id. at 1420.

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 1419.
Id. at 1420.
788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
Id. at 1128.
Id. at 1130-32.
Id. at 1134.
Id. at 1133 n.13.
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use the water it pumps, section 9 liability might have been
far more difficult to determine. Complicating causation issues still further in the basin, irrigation runoff containing
high levels of selenium may also contribute to the river fishes'
2 16
plight.
Perhaps the most important causation issue in a riverine
environment is the fact that water diversions and depletions
upstream have effects hundreds of miles away. It is thus a
thorny problem to decide when and how the chain of causation might be broken - when a given water use upstream
can definitely be said to contribute to habitat damage downstream. In Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews,2 17 the
Tenth Circuit upheld the Corps of Engineers' refusal to exempt plaintiffs from the public hearing requirements for a
section 404 Clean Water Act permit on the ground that impoundment of water in a dam in Colorado would encourage
water use in that state which could adversely affect whooping
2 18
crane habitat in Nebraska.
Flaming Gorge Dam, Strawberry Aqueduct, and the Jensen Unit are large projects for which jeopardy opinions have
already issued. 21 9 Any harms they cause are surely not de
minimis or speculative, and these harms occur in river
reaches that are adjacent to the projects, not hundreds of
miles away. Given that the three projects have operated for
some time without an effective RPA in place and with no authorized incidental take, they should be deemed to be in violation of section 9. Proving section 9 takings, however, would
likely be more difficult than establishing procedural violations of section 7(d). Successful litigation would require
plaintiffs to convince a court in a water-hungry western state
to extrapolate significantly (though logically) from current
216. Interview with Andrew Caputo, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Denver, Colo. (Dec. 4, 1992). Mr. Caputo served as Plaintiff's attorney in Colorado
Wildlife Fed'n v. Turner, No. 92-F-884 (D. Colo. Oct. 27, 1992).
217. 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985), affg 568 F. Supp. 583 (D. Colo. 1983).
218. 758 F.2d at 514. See also Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156, 1171-73 (D. Neb. 1978) (ruling that the Corps of
Engineers must consider Wyoming Dam's impact on the Nebraska whooping
crane habitat before issuing a section 404 permit).
219. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
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section 9 takings cases and would likely require a battle between expert witnesses as to the extent of harms caused to
the river fish by water projects. Since a court would give substantial deference to FWS's view of the welfare of the fish and
the state of their habitat, a section 9 claim could be a formidable battle, but it is certainly a winnable one.
IV.

The Recovery Implementation Program

After a series of section 7220 consultations concerning the
Colorado River Basin in the late 1970s and early 1980s in
which FWS required an RPA of releases from existing reservoirs, the FWS reviewed the Windy Gap and Moon Lake
projects in 1981. FWS found that these projects were not capable of guaranteeing reservoir releases to offset their depletions from the Colorado, Green and White Rivers. 22 1 In
response, FWS developed an approach that came to be known
as the "Windy Gap process": FWS agreed that section 7 jeopardy would be offset if a project would provide funds to be
used in the conservation plan that FWS was developing for
the basin. From 1981 to 1985 FWS issued thirty-three Windy
Gap-type opinions for projects that could deplete up to
415,914 acre-feet of water per year. These consultations generated $1.3 million for stocking, habitat improvement, studies, and other efforts. This process did not, however, apply to
BR projects, which still relied on releases from reservoirs to
avoid jeopardy.
The Windy Gap process proved controversial with environmentalists and water developers alike, and was discontinued in 1985. In 1984 FWS invited two regional directors of
BR and representatives from the states of Colorado, Wyoming and Utah to a meeting which resulted in the six parties
forming the Upper Colorado River Basin Coordinating Committee (UCRBCC). The UCRBCC then agreed to develop and
implement a program of RPAs for the basin. In 1987, the
220. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
221. This account of section 7 consultations in the basin prior to the implementation of the RIP is taken from Wydoski & Hamill, supra note 2, at 126-28
and Zallen, supra note 109.
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UCRBCC produced the Recovery Implementation Program
for Endangered Fish Species in the Upper Colorado River Basin, known to all by the unfortunate acronym "RIP."2 22 The
RIP has served since 1988 as the RPA for new water projects
in the region, applying to private actors via the Clean Water
Act section 404 permitting process. The Program does not
apply to new or existing BR dams, which continue to use
223
RPAs of releases from BR reservoirs.
The RIP is in fact very similar to the Windy Gap process.
It permits projects to offset the impacts of their depletions by
making a one-time contribution of ten dollars per acre-foot,
adjusted for inflation, of a project's average annual depletion. 2 24 FWS also may recommend other measures as part of
a project's RPA in an effort to mitigate project impacts other
2 25
than depletions, such as obstruction of migration routes.
The funds raised through the RIP are used to fund FWS's recovery program, which includes studies, a captive breeding
program, and other measures.
The RIP is also ostensibly intended to acquire instream
flows via a "Water Acquisition Committee" made up of private water users, federal agencies, and the governments of
the affected states. 2 26 The Flaming Gorge Biological Opinion
does not formally incorporate the RIP, but does note: "Ultimately, tributary inflows necessary to satisfy the flow requirements of the endangered fish in the Green River will
also need to be legally protected. Protection of tributary flows
To date the RIP
"..."227
will be pursued through the [RIP] .
has, however, had remarkably little success in obtaining legal
222. Estes, supra note 168, at 1063.
223. Memorandum from Regional Solicitor, Rocky Mountain Region, U.S.
Dept. of the Interior to Regional Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Denver 2 (May 12, 1989) [hereinafter Solicitor's Memo].
224. Wydoski & Hamill, supra note 2, at 128. In the 1992 fiscal year,
projects were required to pay $11.50 per acre-foot. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Section 7 Consultations Involving Water Depletions in the Upper Colorado
River Drainage After Implementation of Recovery Implementation Program
January 1988 (July 1, 1992).
225. Wydoski & Hamill, supra note 2, at 128.
226. Flaming Gorge Opinion, supra note 6, at 33.
227. Flaming Gorge Opinion, supra note 6, at 33.
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protection of instream flows, which bolsters the argument
made above that the Flaming Gorge RPA is far too uncertain
228
of success to meet the standard of Sierra Club v. Marsh.
Even the FWS has recognized this fact. A 1989 memorandum from the FWS Regional Solicitor noted that at that time,
one and one half years after the RIP began, no instream flows
for endangered fish had been legally protected under the program. 2 29 The Solicitor went on to note that there was "'signif-

icant uncertainty' that legal protection of instream flows
which [FWS] determine[d] are biologically needed will be
achieved under the Recovery Program in a timely fashion."230
FWS's own attorney concedes that this "significant uncertainty" runs afoul of the Marsh holding that it is "a violation
of the ESA for [a] federal agency to wait until it is reasonably
certain that the actions described in the reasonable and prudent alternative 'never come to pass' before taking action to
231
be assured of a workable alternative."
Today, four years after the RIP began, "significant uncertainty" remains as to legal protection of flows. Since 1989
FWS has required large depletion projects to provide a
backup measure in addition to the RIP by reserving water to
provide flows for endangered fish in case legal protection of
instream flows cannot be obtained. 232 In addition to
problems acquiring instream flows, FWS has had difficulty
implementing other phases of the RIP. In March, 1992, a
number of captive razorback suckers were killed when a
worker opened the wrong valve at the federal hatchery in
Dexter, New Mexico. 233 Given the holding in Marsh that the
inability to implement an RPA constitutes new information
requiring reconsultation, there seems to be ample evidence
that FWS is required to reconsult on projects now relying on
the RIP. Completed private projects which were subject to
228.
229.
230.
231.
1987)).
232.
233.

816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1987).
Solicitor's Memo, supra note 223, at 3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5 (citing Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1388 (9th Cir.
Id. at 3; Wydoski & Hamill, supra note 2, at 128.
EndangeredFish Die at Hatchery,RocKy MTN.NEWS, Apr. 7, 1992, at 8.
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section 7 consultation only by virtue of the section 404 permit
process may, however, not be candidates for reconsultation as
federal involvement in the projects has ceased. These
projects would in any event still be subject to section 9's taking prohibitions.
It is crucial to note that while the RIP funds FWS's conservation plan, the RIP itself is not a discretionary recovery
program but rather is the means by which the projects that
have contributed to it avoided section 7(a)(2) jeopardy findings and were permitted to proceed. One federal district
court has suggested that FWS need not adhere to its own
ESA section 4(f) "recovery plans,"23 4 provided it makes findings that the plan "would not reasonably promote conservation of the species." 23 5 The RIP, however, was relied on in
each of the consultations in which it has been used to avoid
the ESA's absolute prohibition against federal projects that
would jeopardize an endangered species, absent exemption by
the "God Committee." As the Regional Solicitor concluded:
"Is]ince the Recovery Program is relied on by [FWS] as a reasonable and prudent alternative, section 7 violations could occur if the alternative is not carried out on a timely basis." 23 6
234. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1988).
235. National Wildlife Federation v. National Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384,
388-89 (D. Wyo. 1987) (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)). The red cockaded
woodpecker case, however, rested its holding that the Forest Service had violated sections 7 & 9 largely on the fact that the agency had not followed its own
wildlife management handbook. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, 1264
(E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in relevant part sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yuetter, 926
F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
236. Solicitor's Memo, supra note 223, at 1 (for an explanatory discussion,
see id. at 3). There are suggestions in ESA case law that a federal agency is not
bound to implement an RPA if it can show that its actions will not result in
jeopardy to endangered species under section 7(a)(2). See Tribal Village of
Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 1988) (Secretary of Interior did
not fully adopt RPA for oil lease sale); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376,
1386 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The ESA does not give FWS the power to order other
agencies to comply with its requests . . . ."). However, BR's settlement of the
recent suit in California alleging sections 7 & 9 violations for its failure to comply with an RPA for operation of a dam does suggest that agencies are unwilling
to deviate from RPAs. See Pacific Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns v. Lujan,
CIV-S-92 1492 LKK (E.D. Cal.), discussed supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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Projects relying on the RIP may also be in violation of
ESA section 9.237 Most of the projects for which the RIP is an
RPA are privately owned. Non-federal entities can be permitted to make incidental takes under ESA section 10238 so long
2 39
as the take meets the section 7(a)(2) jeopardy standard,
but the authorization process is more cumbersome than the
section 7(b)(4) permitting process 2 40 for federal entities.
Among other requirements, section 10 requires that FWS
publish non-federal entities' applications for incidental take
permits in the Federal Register and receive public comments. 24 1 An extensive search of the Federal Register
reveals no applications for incidental take permits of endangered fish in the Colorado River Basin, and no known secondary sources indicate that section 10(a) permits 242 have been
granted under the RIP. If this is in fact the case, then any
take by projects using the RIP as an RPA would constitute a
section 9 violation, as is described above in Section III.
V. ESA § 7 Requirements Imposed by the Designation
of Critical Habitat for the Razorback Sucker
In October, 1992 the Colorado Federal District Court, in
Colorado Wildlife Federationv. Turner, ordered FWS to designate critical habitat for the razorback sucker. 24 3 The order
required FWS to publish proposed critical habitat by the end
of January, 1993, and then to proceed with a final designation as rapidly as the ESA permits. The decision should have
ended a long season of foot-dragging by FWS and brought a
great deal of section 7 consultation activity to the basin. The
section 7 consultation regulations provide that reinitiation of
formal consultation "is requiredand shall be requested by the
federal agency or by [FWS]... if a new species is listed or
critical habitat is designated that may be affected by the
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1988).
16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1988).
See Cheever, supra note 73, at 169-70.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (1988).
16 U.S.C. § 1539(c) (1988).
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1988).
No. 92-F-884, slip op. at 8 (D. Colo. Oct. 27, 1992).
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identified action."244 The regulations do limit reconsultation
to projects in which federal involvement or control remains, 245 and so private projects which have already been
granted section 404 permits could be exempted. Section 404
permits do, however, often contain reopener provisions that
allow permit modification in the event new environmental
impacts are discovered. In construing one such permit, the
Nebraska Federal District Court held that "[t]he fact that a
stretch [of river] that may be affected by the Project was not
declared critical habitat until after issuance of the [section
404] permit does not alter the duties of the Corps [of Engineers] as to that habitat."246
FWS complied with the first part of the district court's
order by issuing a notice of proposed critical habitat, not only
for the razorback, but for all four of the endangered river fish,
on January 29, 1993.247 The notice proposes to designate as
critical habitat a total of 2,094 miles of river in or bordering
on six states. However, advocates for the river fishes are not
yet satisfied. FWS noted that its proposal was issued without
a "Biological Support Document" or an economic analysis,
both of which FWS contends it must complete before it can
make the designation final. While it is true that the ESA requires the agency to make cost-benefit assessments when determining critical habitat,248 the entire thrust of the district
court's order in Turner was that the ESA plainly mandates
that FWS designate critical habitat based on the best available data within two years of the initial proposal to list a species, rather than waiting until it is satisfied that it knows all
24 9
there is to know.

On September 21, 1993, Chief Judge Sherman Finesilver
of the Federal District Court for the District of Colorado ruled
from the bench that FWS must publish its final designation
244. 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.16, 402.16(d) (1992) (emphasis added).
245. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (1992).
246. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., [1979] 12 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1156, 1172 (D.Neb. Oct. 2, 1978).
247. Proposed Determination of Critical Habitat for the Colorado River Endangered Fishes, 58 Fed. Reg. 6578 (Jan. 29, 1993).
248. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1988).
249. Turner, No. 92-F-884, slip op. at 8-9 (interpreting ESA § 4(b)(6)(C)(ii)).
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of critical habitat by March 15, 1994.250 A final written order
in this matter has yet to issue and the Turner plaintiffs continue to disagree as to what extent FWS must present its economic analysis for public comment before publication. 251 On
November 12, 1993, FWS published a notice in the Federal
Register extending the comment period for the proposed critical habitat until January 11, 1994.252 This notice indicates
that FWS will accept comments on both its Biological Support Document and its economic analysis, both of which FWS
253
says are now available to the public.
FWS's recalcitrance in designating critical habitat for
the razorback is typical of its execution of the ESA in the basin - indeed, the first notice of intent to determine critical
habitat for the squawfish and the humpback was published
in 1975, nearly twenty years ago. 254 Now that FWS faces a

court-ordered deadline and has published a critical habitat
proposal, perhaps the river fish will at last receive this vital
component of the ESA's protection. However, FWS now faces
a potential legal challenge from another quarter that could
work to further delay the designation process. In April, 1993,
several Colorado water districts gave notice of their intent to
sue to force FWS to file an environmental impact statement
relating to the critical habitat designation. 25 5 At least one
256
court has been receptive to just such a challenge.
The designation of critical habitat for the river fish is a
serious matter. As noted above, and as held by the Turner
250. Telephone Interview with Lori Potter, Managing Attorney, Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund, Denver, Colo. (Nov. 11, 1993). Ms. Potter was the Plaintiffs attorney in Colorado Wildlife Fed'n v. Turner, No. 92-F-884 (D. Colo. Oct.
27, 1992).
251. Id.
252. 58 Fed. Reg. 59,979 (1993).
253. Id. at 59,980.
254. Proposed Determination of Critical Habitat for the Colorado River Endangered Fishes, 58 Fed. Reg. 6578, 6581 (Jan. 29, 1993).
255. Letter of intent to file citizen suit under the Endangered Species Act for
failure to abide by the National Environmental Policy Act, from Janice C.
Sheftel, Durango, Colo., to Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior (April 1,
1993).
256. Douglas County v. Lujan, No. 91-6423-HO (D. Or. Dec. 22, 1992).
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court, 25 7 the designation of critical habitat provides a species
with additional protections not provided by section 7(a)(2)'s
jeopardy standard. 258 Reconsultation would be required for
projects that "may affect" the razorback's critical habitat and
could result in protection not provided by current RPAs. Further, critical habitat designation could require reworking the
RIP. At present the RIP applies only to the upper basin. The
largest razorback population still in existence, however, is in
25 9
the lower basin, in Lake Mojave.
Finally, and potentially most importantly, FWS has indicated unofficially that its critical habitat determination for
the razorback may include minimum streamflows. 26 0 The
proposed designation does not specifically mention minimum
flows, but does note that one of the "primary constituent elements" of the fishes' habitat is "water of sufficient quality...
that is delivered to a specific location in accordance with a
hydrologic regime that is required for the particular life stage
for each species." 2 61 There is precedent for including streamflows in habitat designations: critical habitat for the endangered Concho water snake includes specific minimum flows
and continuous daily flows as constituent elements. 26 2 As the
RIP's failure to legally protect flows indicates all too well,
FWS needs to take affirmative steps to ensure adequate instream flows for the river fish. Including minimum flow recommendations in the fishes' critical habitat is logical merely designating a stretch of river accomplishes nothing by
itself - and may well force FWS to think seriously and creatively about ways to give endangered fish in the Colorado
Basin the protection the ESA requires. State governments
257. No. 92-F-884, slip op. at 7.
258. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
259. Flaming Gorge Opinion, supra note 6, at 19; Plaintiffs Reply Brief on
Motion for Summary Judgment at 5 n.6, Colorado Wildlife Fed'n v. Turner, No.
92-F-884.
260. Interview with Andrew Caputo, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Denver, Colo. (Dec. 14, 1992). Mr. Caputo served as Plaintiffs attorney in Colorado
Wildlife Fed'n v. Turner, No. 92-F-884 (D. Colo. Oct. 27, 1992).
261. Proposed Determination of Critical Habitat for the Colorado River Endangered Fishes, 58 Fed. Reg. 6578, 6582 (Jan. 29, 1993).
262. 50 C.F.R. § 17.95(c) (1992) (noted in Estes, supra note 168, at 1038).
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and water rights holders are likely to protest the inclusion of
minimum flows in critical habitat, but FWS should use the
opportunity to promote new thinking and workable compromises. 26 3 Such an approach would, at last, afford endangered fish the protection to which they are entitled by law,
and would be a welcome change from the half measures FWS
has taken for too long.
VI.

Conclusion

Since 1977, FWS has issued well over one hundred jeopardy opinions for water projects in the Colorado River Basin.2 64 As is allowed by the ESA, these projects have been
permitted to proceed under "reasonable and prudent alternatives" 2 65 - reservoir releases, Flaming Gorge Dam reoperation, and the Recovery Implementation Plan. It is all too
clear, however, that none of these RPAs is meeting even its
own limited goals. FWS has generally sought to avoid the
wrath of water appropriators and state governments - and
thus to avoid creative, effective solutions - rather than to
implement the ESA's mandate that endangered species be ac266
corded the "highest of priorities."
Fundamental changes in western water law are inevitable over the next decade. 26 7 As water policies are re-thought
and re-crafted, we have an unprecedented opportunity to
undo at least some of the damage done to the Colorado River
Basin's riverine environments. Moreover, we can make protection of endangered species an integral part of our planning
rather than a mere afterthought in which we attempt to
tweak an essentially environmentally unsound system of
263. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (1988) provides: "It is further declared to be the
policy of Congress that Federal agencies shall cooperate with State and local
agencies to resolve water resource issues in concert with conservation of endangered species." Id.
264. Solicitor's Memo, supra note 223, at 2.
265. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (1988).
266. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
267. See generally Mary A.M. Gindhart, Time to Pay for Arizona's Thirst,
THE ARiZONA REPUBLiC, Aug. 2, 1993, Northwest Community at 2 (rewriting the
section of the western water law pertaining to the Colorado River is a monumental task, that Betsy Rieke, the newly appointed Asst. Secretary for Water
and Science of the Department of the Interior, has made her goal).
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water law. The ESA can and should serve as a lever to begin
to dislodge entrenched western water interests. It is, more
importantly, the law of the land and should no longer be met
with halfhearted compliance. The Fish and Wildlife Service
and the Bureau of Reclamation have too long dodged their
responsibilities to endangered Colorado River Basin fish.
The razorback, squawfish, humpback and bonytail are entitled to the full protection of the Endangered Species Act.
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